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This  paper considers  the  consequences  of  greater  immigration  of  unskilled  labor  on  income 
distribution  and  welfare  in  the  receiving  comtry.  To  address  these  issues,  both  the  sending  and 
receiving  countries  are  represented  in  a  static  general  equilibrium  model  which  distinguishes 
between  skilled  agd  unskilled  labor  and  which  allows  prices  to  be  determined  endogenously.  In 
this  framework  an  inflow  of  unskilled  labor  is  likely  to  reduce  wages  of  unskilled  labor,  but 
whether  capital  or  skilled  labor  benef.ts  depends  upon  demand  elasticities,  elasticities  of 
substitution  in production,  and  differences  across  countries  in the  productivity  of unskiiled  labor. 
National  welfare  in  the  receiving  country  is likely  to  rise,  to  the  extent  that  the  relative  price  of 
importable  goods  falls,  non-residents  already  in  the  country  receive  lower  wages,  immigrants 
receive  lower  wages  than  those  paid  to  domestic  workers,  and  immigrants  cause  little  increased 
demand  for  public  services  and  transfer  programs. 
The  United  States  and  several  economically  developed  European  nations 
have  recently  considered  or  actually  adopted  increasingly  stringent  measures 
against  immigration  of unskilled  workers.  For  instance,  in  1973, the  Fed.eral 
Republic  of Germany  imposed  a  ban  on  the  entrance  of additional  foreign 
workers,  a  policy  that  has  had  its  greatest  impact  on  unskilled  workers  who 
e  in  substantial  numbers  from  Mediterranean  countries 
ante,  the  Communist  party  has  militantly  advocated  a 
halt  to  all  immigration  into  the  country  and  the  French  g-3vernment  has 
! :ave.  Also,  the 
ates  Select  Commission  on  erihgee Policy  has 
for  alze imposition  of 
re  unskilled  workers 
~gratio~ measures, 
not  won  universal  s  various  f-11  yloyer 
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the  voters  rejected  a  proposal  to  extend  greater  rights  to  seasonal  foreign 
workers. 
o  give  some  insight  into  the  p  ible  reasons  for  these  conflicting  views, 
paper  identifies  key  factors  come  distributi,on  within  the 
recipient  country  of  increased  immigration  by  unskilled  workers.  A  static 
general  equilibrium  model  is  presented  which  differs from  previous  research 
in  two  important  aspects:  (1)  a  broader  set  of  distributio~ai  results  is 
generated  by  allowing  for  different  labor  skill  groups  within  the  country,  in 
contrast  to  roaches  which  assume  all  domestic  employees  are  affected 
identically  [  shan  and  Needleman  ( 1968), Casas  and  Scully  (1972),  and 
Krauss  (1976)];  and  (2)  the  important  role  of  terms  of  trade  changes  is 
captured  by  dropping  the  small  country  assumption  of  exogenously-given 
ces, which  more  naturally  has  been  imposed  ill studies  of the  brain  drain 
om  developing  countries  [see  Qhagwati (1976)].  The  model  is used  to  show 
t  the  pattern  of  income  redistribution  carunot  be  predicted  a  priori, 
though  it  can  be  shown  to  depend  upon  a  set  of  easily  dlescribed 
conditions.  These  projected  changes  in  income  distribution  also  are  used  to 
m.ake an  assessment  of the economic  efficiency eflects in the  recipient  country 
tcr  immigration  of  unskilled  workers.  Alternative  interpretations  of 
iency  condition  are  discussed  in order  to  give some  indication  of the 
potential  advisability  of  restricting  such  immigration  from  a  national 
pers  tive. 
ecause  the  major  implications  to  be drawn  from  this  paper  deal  with  the 
recipient.  developed  country,  the  analytical  model  is  developed  mere 
mpleteIy  with  respect  to  production  conditions  in  it.  In  that  country, 
enoted  Country  A, three  factors  of production,  unskilled  labor  (VIA),  skilled 
labor  (V;Aj, and  capital  (V,), are  assumed  to  produce  two  commodities  IX,, 
and  X,J.  Skilled and  unskilled  labor  are  specific factors  in that  the former  is 
used  only  in  the  production  of  X,  and  the  latter  is  used  only  in  the 
~lrod~~~ion of x,.”  ifal,  on  ;he other  hand,  is intersectorally  mobile  and 
may  therefore  be used in  the production  of either  commodity.  Supplies  of all 
I  guez  (I976)  also  utiliiiRs ,a model  which  assuxnes  unskilled  labor  is  used  exclusively  in 
Pro  g X,,  skilled  labor  is used  exclusively  in producing  X2, and  physical  capital  is comnaon 
KJ “~th  sectors.  His  dynamic  analysis  explicitly  considers  the  saving  necessary  to  permit  the 
portion  of  the  labor  force  that  is  skiLed  to  vary.  That  factor  is  not  =aptured  in  the  present 
Another  perspccrive  from  which  to  view 
nted  labor  markets  which  results  in 
SLlrE  52ctms  end  jobs,  and  0th factors  are  assumed  to  be  fixe  ,  although  the  supply  of  V,,  may  be 
augmented  by immigration  of unskilled  workcr~. 
The  assu  tig,n that  the  two  types  of labor  are  specific  fnctors  reflects  an 
tmension  of  the  current  illegal  immigration  situation  in  the 
United  States  and  the  influx  of  guest  workers  in  Europe.  In  the  United 
tates,  the  incoming  illegal  migrants  tend  to  be  young  unskilled  males  who 
o  not  take  up  permanent  lius  (1977),  Dagodag  (1973, 
oustoun  ( 19?6)].  uently  make  periodic  trips  to 
of  origin  in  order  to  maintain  cor:tact  with  their  families. 
,  these  individuals  are  generally  employed  in  the  agricultural, 
service,  and  light  manufacturing  sectors  of  the  economy  where  seasonal  or 
short-term  jobs  requiring  few skills  are  available.  Within  Europe  the  to-and- 
fro  nature  of this  immigration  has  been  reduced  somewhat  by  a  shift  in  the 
expected  ease  of re-entry.  The  classification  of these  immigrants  as  unskilled 
seems largely  correct,  t  or  instance.  a  1972 survey  of foreign  workers 
in  Germany  cited  by  77)  shows  that  less  than  half  of  the  foreign 
workers  halle more  than  five years  of education. 
NevertheEtr.s, these  circumstances  alone  do  not justit:  the  use of a  specific 
factor  fl) .vuldtion  for  the  production  side  of  the  model,  as  both  unskilled 
and  skilled  labor  from  legal  domestic  sources  still  may  be  employed  in  the 
productitin  OT  both  X,  and  X,.  Batra  and  Casas  ( 1976) have  analyzed  this 
more  ger.eral  case  where  all  three  factors  are  used  in  the  production  of each 
good.  In  their  analysis,  however,  commodity  prices  are  treated  as  fixed 
internationally,  an  assumption  which  is not  entirely  relevant  to  treating  the 
problem  of unskilled  labor  migration  into  developed  countries.  Generalizing 
the  Batra  and  Casa  approach  to  allow  for  endogenous  commodity  price 
*determination  is difficult,  since  precise  s%sumptions  regarding  relative  factor 
intensities  would  have  to  be  made  in  order  to  predict  the  outcome  oi 
changing  any  exogenous  variable.  In  other  words,  results  similar  to  those 
Ipresented here  would  be  obtained  as  factor  intensity  conditions  approached 
the  case  of  two  specific  factors  adopted  here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  input 
requirements  of  skilled  and  unskilled  labor  were  quite  similar  in  she  two 
sectors,  the  types  of  redistributive  effects  projected.  here  wouid  be  less 
relevant. 
‘he  production  relations  in the  MO  are  almost  identical  to  these  found 
ith  respect  to  the  veioped  country:  ( 1)  the  production 
functions  in  both  sectors  of  the  economy  arc  linearly  ho~~log~~eous,  and  (3 
ity  markets  ar  ~o~~~~~~t~t~ve  equi  cst‘ :wo  assu 
imply  that  all  ors  of production  are 
entrepreneurs  earn  zero  profits.  ~~~ebraic~~~y,  these  coa:ditiont;  can  be 106  J.  Mutti  and 5:.  Perking,  Greater  inmigrution  of  unskilled  labor 
%2X2,4  =  k;A*  (2) 
where  ajj  denotes  the  input-output  coefficient  describing  the  average 
quantity  of  factor  i  ii== 1,2, N)  used  to  produce  one  unit  of  commodity  j 
f_6  = I, 2); -via (i=  1,2, N) denotes  the  nominal  reward  paid  to  factor  i; and  P 
denotes  the  prize  per  unit  of commodity  1 relative  to  the  price  per  unit  of 
coylmodity  2. Any  increased  immigration  of  unskilled  labor  appears  as  an 
increase  in  VIA,  and  these  workers  are  assumed  to  receive the  same  nominal 
wage, Ri  A,  as comparable  domestic  workers. 
The  less  developed  country  from  which  this  unskilled  labor  emigrates. 
denoted  as  Country  B  here,  is  assumed  to  produce  and  export  only  X,, 
which  requires  inputs  of  capital  and  unskilled  labor.  While  this  framework 
may  over  simplify  economic  relationships  in  the  developing  country,  the 
implication  of  relatively  greater  diversity  of  production  in  the  deve!oped 
country  does  seem  realistic.  Neither  capital  nor  labor  is  assumed  to  move 
freely between  countries.  Rather,  CSnly  parametric  shifts in  factor  supplies  are 
ith  respect  to  labor  migration,  this  change  might  reflect changes 
on  laws  or  the  stringency  of current  enforcement  procedures.  If 
there  is  full  employment  of  labor  in  the  developing  country,  then  that 
condition  would  appear  as 
otation  parallels  t.hat  used  in  eq.  (1).  Any  reduction  in  the 
skilled  labor  in Country  would  caus;e output  there  to fall. 
ially  there  w  considerable  une 
tion  might  not  require  any  reduction  in national 
at  d~st~~ct~o~  is  c~~d~tio~s  are 
co~~dered~ ‘The releva  ndition  may  be vrritien  as  a  balance 
in  terms  of  to where  uantity  demanded.  uantities  demanded  are  functions  of 
relative  prices and  income,  where  the  income  earned  in each  country  is given 
bY 
Tastes  in  both  countries  are  assumed  to  be identical  and  homothetic,  so  that 
an  influx  of  immigrants  into  the  developed  country  does  not  directly  alter 
national  consumption  patterns.’ 
The  importance  of the  full employment  condition  in  Country  B is that  YH 
may  or  may  not  fall  when  unskilled  labor  emigrate.5  to  the  developed 
country.  In  the  polar  case  where  all  emigrants  initially  are  unemployed,  or 
can  bc replaced  costlzssly  by  those  who  are  unemployed,  then  YB  will not  fall 
at  all.  %f  instead  output  of  XIB  falls,  then  income  in  Country  B  falls,  and 
correspondingly  its demand  for imports  of X2 will fall. 
Eqs. (1) through  (9) provide  the  basis  for  projecting  the  effects of changes 
in  the  immigration  of unskilled  labor  into  the  developed  country.  As shcwn 
explicitly  in  the  appendix,  all  equations  are  expressed  in  relatil z  rates  of 
change  to  facilitate  the  derivation  of  sohltions.  With  respect  to  the  factor 
reward  and  output  changes  considered,  two  alternative  interprerations  are 
given,  one  where  increased  immigration  does  not  reduce  output  in  Country 
, and  o;r;  where it does. 
ces of  greaber  i  ration  of  urns  ed  labor 
An  influx  of  unskilled  labor  into  the  developed  country  unambiguously 
will  incre.lse  t  ut  of  X1  there.  Of  the  six  variables  to  be  ana 
IX,,,,  X2&  h.  NA,  P)  tha? is the  only  change  which can  be predict 
such  an  ~~quali~ed  fashion.  P.  major  reason  for  the  ambiguity  in  the 
rern~~i~in~  results  is t  rent  output  effects in the developing 
country  when  labo  For  instance,  in  the  case  where 
on  the  output  of XIB3 as 
ioyed  in  Country 
d its  relative  price falls. 
ountry  A falls, since  the 
‘All  :mme  earned  in  the  d country  is spent  there.  stated  in  other  terms.  f0r  ilkgrl 
i171?L?!.  .;nes or  ..’  ‘OF&kxS  part  of  their  ear~~~~s ba  to  their  country  of  origin.  they 
mlhst  d9  so  t  hying  goods  produced  in  the  developed  country.  That  condition  is 
necessary  in a barter  mode!  where  no  financial  claims  exist. 108  J.  Mtttiti  and S. Gerkirtg, Greater  immigrutimt of unskdlcd  labor 
productivity  of  this  fact  declines  as  the  capital-labor  ratio  falls  and  t 
value of the  output  it pr  ces declines as ~ell.~ 
hen  emigration  of labor  out  of  causes  a  redl;ction  in output 
of XIB, then  the  effect of immigrati  output  of X,  7s unckar  and 
the  relative  price  of  XI  need  not  fall  either.  owever,  VNhcn  tastes  are 
identical  and  homothetic  in  both  countries,  a  key  condition  emerges  which 
s  the  case  of  rising  prices  to  be  ruleal out:  if RI  A  is  greater  than  RIB 
the  relative  price  of  Xi  must  fall.  An  intuitive  explanation  of  this 
condition  is that  higher  wages  in  Country  A reflect  the  greater  productivity 
af workers  there,  aild the  reallocation  of labor  from Country  I3 to Country  A 
wit1 allow for an increase  in the  total  output  of X,.  In that  case, which seems 
y in the  American  and  European  contexts  discussed  above,  the real wage 
nskilled  labor  also  must  fall in the  developed  country  since  R,,  declines 
y a greater  percentage  than  P (see appendix). 
hanges  in the output  of XZA, the return  to capital  in Country  A, and  the 
return  to  skilled  labor  in  Country  A  all  depend  upon  a  common  set  of 
economic  factors.  cause  X2 is the  numeraire  good,  the  percentage  change 
in  the  return  to  cqital  will  be  a  simple  multiple,  opposite  in  sign,  of  the 
rcentage  change  in  the  wage  of  skilled  labor.  Additionally,  whetber  the 
return  to  capital  rises  depends  upon  whether  output  of  XZA contracts  and 
capital  is reIeased to be utilized  with the’greater  available  supply  of uqskihed 
labor  in the  production  of X,,. 
In  the  case  oi  initial  unemployment  in  Country  B  this  direction  of 
movement  of capital  depends  upon  the following expression: 
where r  denotes  the cross-price  elasticity  of demand  for X2 given a change  in 
Pt  (assumed  to  be positive),  n iA represents  the  share  of Country  A’s income 
a~~:o~nt~  for  by  Xi,  output,  and  blA  is  the  elasticity  of  substitution 
&t.ween  unskilled  labor  and  capital  in  the  production  of  Xl,.  The 
aumerator  of  the  first  term  is  simply  a  weighted  average  of  the  income 
loss-price  elasticiGes  of  demand  for  XzA, where  the  weights 
consumption  occurring  in tlae two  countries  [see 
As  1, the  entire  fir  term 
can  never  n  any  case,  the  bi  P the 
pure  price  eiasticity  shown  tbc  numerator  of (IO), the  greater  vi11 bli: the 
when  .P falls. As a result,  vNA  tends  to  be transferred ULLIO~  to  X,,  production,  X,,  output  contracts,  and  R,~~ 
o~setti~g  the  tendency  for  R,,  to  rise  is  captured  by the 
second  term  in eq. (IO). This  term  reflects  the  fact that  the  greater  availability 
of unskilled  labor  in Country  A also  allows  unskilled  labor  to  be substituted 
for capital  in the  production  of Xi*.  If this  latter  efEect domi lutes,  capital  is 
released  from  X iA production  to  be  utilized  in  the  increased  production  of 
X  2A3  where  both  its  physical  productivity  and  its  nominal  reward  must  fall 
when combined  with  the fixed amount  of skilled  labor  working  *:here. 
hen  emigration  of  labor  from  Country  B causes  a  fall  in  output  there, 
then  that  factor  calls  for  a  modification  of eq. (10) since  demand  for  JiZA is 
reduced.. Specifically, 
where  IX’  denotes  the  Erst term  in eq. (10).  Eq. (11)  indicates  that  if RI.4 = R,,, 
then  output  of X2,,  unambiguously  must  fall. Wowever, if labor  productivity 
in Country  A exceeds that  in Country  B (RI*>  RIB),  the  previously  discussed 
focus  on  elasticities  of  demand  versus  elasticities  of  substitution  in 
production  still is relevant. 
By  way  of  summary,  X2*  is  more  likely  to  fall  the  more  price  elastic  is 
demand  for X,,,  the  smaller  the elasticity  of substitution  between  capiial  ant 
labor  in  the  production  of  XIA,  and  the  smaller  the  initial  wage  gap  for 
unskilled  labor  between  Countries  A  and  B. Correspondingly,  when  X,,4 
falls,  returns  to  capital  rise  while  wages  of  skilled  labor  fall.  To  the  extent 
that  capitalists  are  a  small  proportion  of  the  population.  an  attitude  of  the 
general  public  against  greater  immigration  is understandable  since both  labor 
groups  experience  reductions  in wages as a consequence! 
The  distributional  results  cited  above  probably  are  good  indicators  of 
public  policy  decisions  when  no  transfer  program  exists  to  compensate 
from  increased  i  migration.  An  alternative  question  to 
er  there  are  net  ains  to  the  developed  country  from 
allowing  greater  immigration,  so  that  compensation  could  be 
s  discussions  suggest 
nswers  IO this  der  (8963)  and  Jones 
t  increased  immigration  is  likely 110  .I. Mutti and S  Gerking,  Greater  immigration  of unskiilecl  lahnr 
To  evaluate  the  change  in  welfare of the  economicalBy developed  country, 
one  way  of  proceeding  is  to  totally  differeR~tiate its  cclrn 
function,  U,,(CIAI C,,J,  where  CrA  enotes  co~swmpti~~  of Xi  by  citizens  of 
Country  A  That  is, 
where  RIAF,  denotes  the  income  of  and  the  amount  of  consumption 
expenditures  by  foreign  workers  present  in  Country  A (PA). The  differential 
of the community  utility  function  may  be written  as 
dU/&  =PdCIA+dCzA,  (13) 
since the  marginal  utility  of consuming  good  1, U,,  relative  to  the  marginal 
titrility of eonsuming  good  2,  Uz, equals  the  price  ratio,  P. To  re-express  eq. 
{ 12)  in terms  of variables  analyzed  in the model,  totallv  ditt’erentiate (12). and 
make  use of the simplification 
(14) 
The welfare function  in eq. (13) reduces  to 
dU/U;! = -PdP,.+(L-C,.)dP,  (15) 
which can  be rewritten  somewhat  more  suggestively  as 
dU/U,=  -FdR,A+(DIA-C,~dP+(X,,-D,.)dP, 
by adding  and  subtracting  D,,P  on the right-hand  side of (15). 
Assume  that  the  initial  #age  differential  favors  the  developed  country  so 
that  the  relative  price of X,  falls regardless  of the extent  of unemployment  in 
the  developing  country.  Then,  the  first  term  in  (16)  represents  a  gain  in 
e  original  residents  of  Country  A,  since  the  foreign  workers 
t now receive  lower  wages, while  the  second  term  rep 
those same residents  since the foreigners  can  now pur 
at  lower p&es.  owever, the  sum  of  -FdR,A+(D~,-C,A)dP  is necessarily 
sitive,  regardless  of  ntage  of income  allocated  by ountry  A,.  alance,  the  develo  ed  country  experiencl:;3  a  net 
welfare gain  as a result  of the  Influx  of  unskille 
is  preach  also  reflects  a  view  mentioned  b,~  Redcr  and  er;lpirically 
estimat  lit2 for  the  case  of Germany:  es the  recipient  coldntry  gain 
from  ihe  inflow  of  human  capital  for  which  has  not  had  to  make  he&h 
and  educational  expenditures?  The  present  formulation  does  not  consider 
this  investment  process  because  t  e direct  question  of wna-- investment  would 
have  been  necessary  to  rear  an  parable  number  of  domestic 
workers  is  not  asked.  ather,  foreign  immigrants  capture  part  of  the  gains 
from  the  human  capital  which  they  represent.  Thus,  the  more  basic  question 
from  the  standpoint  of  original  residents  of  Country  ‘4 is  what  they  gain 
from  this  inflow of labor.  The  value  of additional  output  available  to  them  is 
captured  by  the  terms  in eq.  (1 S),  which  simply  represent  the  welfare  gain  as 
a current  flow and  not  as a capitalized  stock. 
Why  have  other  studies  obtained  negative  welfare  impacts  in  recipient 
countries?  .Although  the  actual  models  applied  differ  in  many  respects,  one 
distinction  between  the  present  paper  and  the  analysis  of  Mirhan  and 
Needleman  is  the  latter’s  assumption  that  the  economy  only  produces  a 
single  good.  Hence,  all  immigrants  work  in  the  exportables  sector,  and 
increased  immigration  causes  the terms  of trade  to move  against  the recipient 
country.  Alhhough  the  authors  state  that  Jamaicans  generally  work  in  non- 
traded  service industries,  their  model  does  not  capture  that  dimension  of the 
situation. 
A  second  distinction  between  the  two  studies  revolves  around  a  point 
developed  more  thoroughly  by  Usher  (1977)  and  by  Gauss  and  Baumoi: 
greater  immigration  may  require  government  outlays  for  social  capital  or 
transfer  payments,  while immigrants  may  not  pay  taxes  which  fully cover  the 
cost  of these  programs.  In  other  words,  eq.  (13) rests  on  an  over-simplified 
representation  of national  welfare, since consumptnon  of privnte  goods  only  is 
considered.  Allowing for public  goods,  and  the  likely congestion  which would 
arise  in  their  use  from  greater  immigration,  or  explicitly  incorporating  the 
balance  bel.ween tax  paymen’s  made  and  transfer  payments  received,  would 
raise  the  possibility  that  natiwlal  welfare  c  uld fall,  if this  negative  externality 
dorni~ated  the  w:age and  pri-:e effects ah-e 
n  an  empirical  level,  thr; ii 
ouston  (1976) an 112  J.  Mutti and S. Gerking,  Grmter  imnkgration  of unskilled labor 
this  balance  may  be  somewhat  different  ~~rticular:y  since  the 
1’973 of  a  ban  on  the  recruitment  of  workers  outside  of  t 
Ecolilomk  community.  any  foreign  workers  already  workin 
were  iess  likely  to  retur,.  1  home,  even  if  they  became  ~~nemp~oyed,  for 
tPsat they  might  not  be readmitted  in the  future.  Thus,  the  de 
g.>rvices by  foreign  workers  may  have  become  greater  ihan 
I!473  period.  Also,  the  broader  scale  of  European  social  programs, 
purtieularly  with  respect  to  housing  and  health  care,  suggests  that  benefits 
received  would  have  been  greater  than  in  the  United  States.  On  the  other 
Etand, the  greater  importance  of  payroll  taxes  as  a  source  of  government 
revenue  in  European  countries  implies  that  tax  payments  by  foreign  workers 
and  the  percentage  of  benefits  financed  by  their  contribution  might  be 
greater  than  in the United  States. 
A further  factor  not  considered  in the  present  framework  is the  possibility 
that  foreign  workers  are  paid  less  t&an  domestic  warkers.  As  European 
restrictions  on  geographic  or  occupational  mobility  are  raised,  the  potential 
to  treat  foreign  workers  differently  than  domestic  uorkers  is  increased. 
Furthermore,  European  Commission  directives  in  the  mid-1970s  to 
standardize  penalties  against  those  hiring  illegal  aliens  indicate  that  even 
with  large  nambers  of legal  foreign  workers  already  in  the  community,  the 
incentive  for illegal aliens  to  seek work had  not  evaporated,  just  as it has not 
in  the  case  af  the  United  States.  The  unregulated  nature  of this  employment 
particuiiarly  gives rise  to  the  potential  for  employers  to  pay  lower  wages to 
these workers.  That  situation  results  in an  additional  gain in nationa  income 
for the developed  country,  although  the implications  with respect  to domestic 
politica!  stability  may  be  less  sanguine.  Also,  if  current  restrictions  already 
have  created  the  possibility  to  discriminate  against  foreign  workers,  then 
proposals  to  levy fines or  other  penalties  on  employers  of illegal  aliens  may 
have  no  effect  on  outputs  or  relative  prices.  Rather,  a  rent  simply  may  be 
transferred  from  the employers  to the government. 
t  to  systematically  treat  the  im~~icatiot~s L-V  ~NXXZIL’ 
countries  of an  increase  in the rate  of emigration  of 
~~~ski~~ed  workers  from  developing  countries.  ithin  the  context  of a  two- 
ode1 it is shown  th  legal domestic  workers  who 
directly  with  the  unskilled  entrants  are  harmed  in  the  sense  that I  . .  utti  ad  S.  Gerking,  Greater  immigration  of  urddied  labor  13 
e  overall  welfare  impact  of  an 
is di~cult  to  assess.  If negative 
externalities  are  ignored,  welfare  in the  recipient  country  can  be presumed  to 
increase.  In  that  case,  measures  to  Iimit  entry  or  encourage  foreign  workers 
to leave can  be justified  only  on distributional  grounds. 
In  this  appendix  derivations  of the  various  solutions  r:>orted  in the  paper 
are  given.  Totally  differentiating  eqs.  [I),  (2), (3), (4), (5 i, dnd  (7) yields  the 
following  expressions  [see Jones  (1965) for details]: 
XTA -I- $(R;*  -  RT,) = v:,,  IA.l) 
bA.3) 
(1  -$yl*)x:,--~  n,,x:, 
(A.61 
where  Z* -d  Z/Z,  .J$ =u,,X,A/VNA  denotes  the  fraction  of  b$A  employed  in 
the  production  of commodity  j,  St1 = C8i  lRiA/P  denotes  factor  i’s  share  of the 
output  of colnmodity  1, @‘z  zNi2  iA denotes  factor  i’s share  of c 
and  the  are  defined  as: ytr =@$,(T~~~,  -$z=S$E~“r,,D -&l -j-t, 
price elasticity  of deman 
ift of iabor  out  of 114 
manipulated  further,  since  the  total 
fiixed, VIA-k  VIB= IfI, to give X&== - 
The  value  of thr..!  determinant  of this six e  uation  system  is ~,~a~bi~~ou~~~ 
positive  as shown  below, 
S.ince (D2JX2#?2A  = &,+jYA  5  1 the entire  expression  for IDlz 0. 
With  rp,spect to  the endogenous  variables  to  be determined  by  the  model, 
the furrowing results  are  obtained;  where the  price  coefficient in eq. (A.6) has 
been simplified  to appear  as c1,, 
-+i;&6,,6$1 
B  vlA  D;!A  XIA 
Ii------  - 
V  1B  X2A  yA cd  wage  rate  depend  upon  the  size  of  the 
ressions  written  above,  the  first terms  of 
critical;  if they  are  negative,  then’ the  second  terms 
ative,  and  both  the  relative  price  of  X1 
and  wages  paid  to  unski  s  in  Country  A  must  fall.  Given  that 
tastes  are  identical  and  homothetic  in  Co%.mtries A  and  then  D2JYA 
==  ~2~/~~~2~~~~~~,  which  abows  the  term  in brackets  to  be ;e-expressed  in 
terms  of unskilled  wage rates  inr  each  country  as 
-$$k(,RIB-  IX,*).  (A.-J) 
In other  vtords, when  RIA>RIB  then  total  output  of XI  unambiguously  rises 
and  its reiative  price falls. 
To  see  when  real  wages  in  Country  A  will  fall  as  e  result  of  greater 
immigration  of unskilled  labor,  note  that 
RrA  I’* 
------_ 
v:A  v:A 
QA EA  ‘J  N2  *N?  2A -!-  +bV,,-BX,d  X 2A  A 
When  t  A>RlB,  then  this  expression  unambiguously  will  be  negative  since 
labor  i  1 ounts  for less than  the  total  value  of output  in XI*. 
With  respect  to  the  remaining  variables,  by  eq.  (AS)  RzA= 
-(S~,/O~2)R~A,  so  that  consideration  of either  one  aione  is  sufficient. The 
return  to  capital  and  the  change  in  output  of  X2*  depend  upon  similar 
conditions, 
(A. i0) 116  J.  ABurti and  S.  Gerking,  Greater  immigration  of  trnskilled  Mxw 
If eq.  (A.?) equals zero,  then  the latter  two  ter 
to  zero,  and  output  of XI,,  unambi 
its  relative  price  rises,  versu:; 
which may  be rewritten  as shown  in eq. (LO). 
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